Fabrication-less design houses outsource their designs to third-party foundries to lower fabrication cost. However, this creates opportunities for a rogue in the semiconductor foundry to introduce hardware Trojans, which stay inactive most of the time and cause unintended consequences to the system when triggered. Hardware Trojans in traditional CMOS-based circuits have been studied, and Design-for-Trust (DFT) techniques have been proposed to detect them. Different from traditional circuits in many ways, reversible circuits implement one-to-one input/output mappings. In this paper, we investigate the security implications of reversible circuits with a particular focus on the susceptibility to hardware Trojans. To this end, we consider reversible functions implemented using reversible circuits as well as irreversible functions embedded in reversible circuits.

中文翻译：

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论可逆计算架构中的木马植入难点

无制造设计公司将他们的设计外包给第三方代工厂以降低制造成本。然而，这为半导体代工厂中的流氓创造了引入硬件木马的机会，这些木马在大多数时间保持不活动状态，并在触发时对系统造成意外后果。已经研究了传统基于 CMOS 的电路中的硬件木马，并且已经提出了信任设计 (DFT) 技术来检测它们。在许多方面与传统电路不同，可逆电路实现了一对一的输入/输出映射。在本文中，我们研究了可逆电路的安全隐患，特别关注硬件木马的易感性。为此，