To stimulate the capital-constrained manufacturer to produce green products, the government often adopts two incentive mechanisms: green credit (i.e., subsidy offered directly to bank) and subsidy (i.e., subsidy offered directly to manufacturer). This paper examines the optimal interest rate of the bank, and the optimal product green degree and sales price of the manufacturer under the two mechanisms, respectively. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of these mechanisms on the optimal decisions, the profits of players, the social welfare and the environmental benefits. Several important results are obtained. First, when the total government subsidy is low, the green credit mechanism can bring the higher green degree, product sales price and demand, as well as higher profits for the bank and manufacturer, rather than the subsidy mechanism. Otherwise, the result is opposite. Second, the government should adopt the green credit mechanism to support the manufacturer to develop green products when the budget is limited and relatively low. If the government budget is sufficient, the subsidy mechanism is the best choice, which can bring higher economic and environmental benefits.

中文翻译：

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绿色信贷和补贴下资本受限制造商的最优融资和运营决策

为了刺激资金拮据的制造商生产绿色产品，政府通常采用两种激励机制：绿色信贷（即直接提供给银行的补贴）和补贴（即直接提供给制造商的补贴）。本文分别研究了两种机制下银行的最优利率，制造商的最优产品绿色度和销售价格。此外，我们研究了这些机制对最优决策，参与者的利润，社会福利和环境利益的影响。获得了几个重要的结果。首先，当政府总补贴较低时，绿色信用机制可以带来更高的绿色度，产品销售价格和需求，以及银行和制造商更高的利润，而不是补贴机制。否则，结果相反。其次，在预算有限且相对较低的情况下，政府应采用绿色信贷机制支持制造商开发绿色产品。如果政府预算充足，补贴机制是最佳选择，可以带来更高的经济和环境效益。