The purpose of this paper is to investigate the supplier development (SD) in construction industry. As the supplier's production capacity cannot meet the construction requirements, the owner wants to take incentives to encourage the supplier to improve its production capacity. A principal-agent model and a Stackelberg game model are proposed to study the impact of owner's incentives including cost sharing and purchase price incentive on the production capacity improvement in SD. Furthermore, we give a sensitivity analysis of the influence of supplier's internal and external parameters, i.e., purchase quantity, cost structure, market price and market demand, etc., on the production capacity improvement. The findings of this study can help the owner to make a better decision on the incentive mechanisms for SD, resulting in both better SD practices and a win-win situation.

中文翻译：

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在建筑供应商发展中提高生产能力的激励措施

本文的目的是调查建筑行业的供应商发展（SD）。由于供应商的生产能力无法满足建设要求，因此所有者希望采取激励措施，以鼓励供应商提高其生产能力。提出了一种委托-代理模型和一个Stackelberg博弈模型来研究包括成本分摊和购买价格激励在内的所有者激励对SD产能提高的影响。此外，我们对供应商的内部和外部参数（即购买数量，成本结构，市场价格和市场需求等）对产能提高的影响进行了敏感性分析。这项研究的结果可以帮助所有者更好地决定SD的激励机制，