ABSTRACT With the popularity of open source software (OSS) as an alternative to proprietary software (PS), proprietary-software firms such as IBM and Microsoft started to embrace this new paradigm during the past decades. We analyze how firms choose the software development strategy between OSS and PS, by constructing a duopoly model in which consumers sequentially purchase software and complementary services in a market that exhibits an indirect network effect. We show that a PS firm may benefit from the presence of an OSS firm, and the software market can be dominated by a single OSS if the indirect network effect is weak and the cost saving effect of OSS is negligible. We also show that the market can support two OSS if the cost saving effect of OSS is sizeable, and two PS if firms can provide fully compatible services to competitor’s PS. Building upon the existing works that investigate the competition between PS and OSS, this study improves our understanding of the role of OSS in firm’s software development strategy and market equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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向你的竞争对手开放：间接网络效应下开源和专有软件之间的竞争

摘要 随着开源软件 (OSS) 作为专有软件 (PS) 的替代品的流行，IBM 和 Microsoft 等专有软件公司在过去几十年中开始接受这种新范式。我们通过构建双头垄断模型来分析企业如何在 OSS 和 PS 之间选择软件开发策略，其中消费者在表现出间接网络效应的市场中顺序购买软件和补充服务。我们表明，PS 公司可能会从 OSS 公司的存在中受益，如果间接网络效应较弱且 OSS 的成本节约效应可以忽略不计，则软件市场可以由单个 OSS 主导。我们还表明，如果 OSS 的成本节约效果相当可观，市场可以支持两个 OSS，如果公司可以向竞争对手的 PS 提供完全兼容的服务，则市场可以支持两个 PS。