Because of the high information asymmetry of carbon financial products (CFPs), financial institutions infringing on the rights of investors occurred worldwide. However, few studies focused on how to protect investors effectively. In this paper, from the perspective of regulation, we analyze the game relationships among governments, financial institutions, and investors. Following this, the tripartite regulation game of CFPs is further constructed. Meanwhile, centered on heterogeneity and bounded rationality, we divide participants in this game into two types: tough or weak ones, and the strategies for different types of game players are compared based on the prospect theory. Moreover, through discussion of the deterrence equilibrium, challenge equilibrium, and separation equilibrium, the crucial influencing factors of the behavioral strategy are explored separately. Finally, some countermeasures of CFPs are put forward for governments to design appropriate regulation policies.

中文翻译：

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基于前景理论的碳金融产品三方监管博弈

由于碳金融产品（CFP）的高度信息不对称，金融机构侵犯投资者权益的行为在全球范围内时有发生。然而，很少有研究关注如何有效保护投资者。本文从监管的角度分析了政府、金融机构和投资者之间的博弈关系。在此之后，进一步构建了 CFP 的三方监管博弈。同时，我们以异质性和有限理性为中心，将这个博弈的参与者分为强者和弱者两类，并基于前景理论比较了不同类型博弈者的策略。此外，通过对威慑平衡、挑战平衡和分离平衡的讨论，行为策略的关键影响因素单独探讨。最后，提出了一些CFPs的对策，供政府设计适当的监管政策。