We consider a game theoretical model of kleptoparasitic interaction between two individuals, the Owner and the Intruder. The Owner is in possession of a resource and must decide whether to defend the resource against the Intruder or flee. If the Owner defends, the Intruder must decide whether to fight with the Owner or flee. The outcome of the fight depends on the hunger of the individuals, the hungrier the individual is, the more likely they are to win the fight. We consider three scenarios: (a) both individuals know their own and their opponent’s hunger, (b) individuals only know their own hunger but not that of their opponent, and (c) individuals do not know their own nor the opponent’s hunger levels. We determine Nash equilibrium strategies in each scenario. We conclude that Owner is generally willing to defend more often than the Intruder is willing to attack. Also, the Intruder’s payoff is largest in the full information case; but the Owner may benefit in the no information or partial information cases when the cost of the fight is neither too large nor too small.

我们考虑了两个个体（所有者和入侵者）之间的盗窃寄生行为的博弈理论模型。所有者拥有资源，并且必须决定是为入侵者辩护还是为逃避辩护。如果所有者捍卫，则入侵者必须决定是与所有者作战还是逃离。战斗的结果取决于个人的饥饿感，个人的饥饿感越强，他们赢得这场战斗的可能性就越大。我们考虑以下三种情况：（a）两个人都知道自己的饥饿和对手的饥饿，（b）个人只知道自己的饥饿而不是对手的饥饿，并且（c）个人不知道自己的饥饿或对手的饥饿程度。我们确定每种情况下的纳什均衡策略。我们得出的结论是，与入侵者相比，所有者通常更愿意防御。此外，在完整信息案例中，入侵者的收益最大。但是，如果战斗费用既不太大也不不太小，所有者可能会在没有信息或部分信息的情况下受益。