Taxis offer round-the-clock, comfortable, and direct transportation services. In many cities, a large number (or all) of taxi drivers are rentee-drivers who rent taxis from taxi owners. Therefore, interaction exists between taxi owners and rentee-drivers. To regulate taxi markets effectively, it is necessary to model such interaction and investigate how different regulatory regimes affect stakeholders in taxi markets (e.g., taxi owners, rentee-drivers, and customers) and system performance (social welfare) in the presence of such an interaction. This study extends the classical aggregate taxi model to describe the supply of rentee-drivers and their interaction with a monopsony taxi owner. A general supply function is proposed to describe the supply of rentee-drivers in the market. A profit-maximization model and a social welfare maximization model are proposed to describe the decision-making process of the monopsonist and the government, respectively. Analytical and numerical studies are given to illustrate the properties of the proposed models and investigate the effects of fare adjustments and taxi rent/fleet size regulations on the monopsonist, rentee-drivers, customers, and system performance, thereby providing insights into taxi market regulations.

出租车提供全天候，舒适和直接的运输服务。在许多城市，大量（或全部）出租车司机是承租人司机，他们从出租车出租人那里租用出租车。因此，出租车所有者和承租人驾驶员之间存在相互作用。为了有效地规范出租车市场，有必要对这种相互作用进行建模并调查不同的监管制度如何影响出租车市场中的利益相关者（例如出租车所有者，承租人驾驶员和客户）以及系统绩效（社会福利）。相互作用。这项研究扩展了经典的集合出租车模型，以描述承租人司机的供应及其与独身出租车老板的互动。建议使用一般供应函数来描述市场中承租人的供应。提出了利润最大化模型和社会福利最大化模型来描述垄断者和政府的决策过程。进行了分析和数值研究，以说明提出的模型的性质，并研究票价调整和出租车租金/车队大小规定对独身主义者，承租人驾驶员，顾客和系统性能的影响，从而提供对出租车市场规定的见解。