Abstract Drawing on impression management and social exchange theory, we examine the use of positively biased forecasts by (non-)founder-CEOs as an impression management tactic vis-a-vis their existing investors. Contrary to their non-founder counterparts, founder-CEOs identify more with the venture they founded and, therefore, experience greater instrumental and affective concerns about the long-term relationship with their investors. Consequently, we hypothesize that founder-CEOs will strategically provide less positively biased forecasts to their investors than non-founder-CEOs. Using two independent samples with revenue forecasts reported to different venture capital investors and a causal chain scenario study consisting of two experiments, we find consistent support for our hypothesis. Overall, this study provides new insights into the use of forecasts as a post-investment impression management tactic by distinct types of CEOs in entrepreneurial ventures.

中文翻译：

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三明治游戏：创始人兼首席执行官和作为印象管理的预测

摘要 借鉴印象管理和社会交换理论，我们研究了（非）创始人-CEO 使用正偏预测作为一种印象管理策略，以对抗他们现有的投资者。与非创始人同行相反，创始人兼 CEO 更认同他们创立的企业，因此对与投资者的长期关系有更大的工具性和情感性担忧。因此，我们假设创始人 CEO 会比非创始人 CEO 从战略上向他们的投资者提供更少的积极偏见预测。使用两个独立的样本以及向不同风险资本投资者报告的收入预测和由两个实验组成的因果链情景研究，我们发现一致支持我们的假设。全面的，