This study examines how a CEO’s sensitivity affects information transmission from multiple unit managers when they communicate strategically during decision-making for technology investment. We develop a simple cheap talk model comprising one CEO and K unit managers, wherein the CEO makes a decision to maximize the units’ profit after the managers reveal their preference for the decision through cheap talk. We demonstrate that the expected total profit improves when sensitivity to the opinion of a manager whose expected preference is moderate among all managers increases. The driving force of the results is termed as alignment effect; increasing sensitivity to a moderate opinion decreases the difference between the expected CEO’s decision and the managers’ ideals. Furthermore, some implications on the decision-making process in technology investment within firms are discussed.

中文翻译：

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多发送者廉价谈话中的接收者灵敏度与策略信息传输

本研究考察了 CEO 的敏感性如何影响多个部门经理在技术投资决策过程中进行战略沟通时的信息传递。我们开发了一个简单的廉价谈话模型，由一个 CEO 和 K 个部门的经理组成，其中，在经理们通过廉价谈话表明他们对决策的偏好后，CEO 做出了最大化部门利润的决定。我们证明，当对所有经理中预期偏好适中的经理的意见的敏感性增加时，预期总利润会提高。结果的驱动力称为对齐效应；对温和意见的敏感性增加会减少预期 CEO 的决策与管理者理想之间的差异。此外，