In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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景观理论的博弈论模型

在本文中，我们研究了 Axelrod 和 Bennett (1993) 引入的景观理论的博弈论概括。在他们的两个小组设置中，每个玩家根据她对小组成员的个人评估总和对小组进行排名。我们扩展了 Axelrod-Bennett 设置，允许任意数量的集团并扩展可能的偏差集以包括多国渐进偏差。我们表明，始终存在不受盈利逐渐偏差影响的帕累托最优景观均衡。我们还指出，虽然在纯策略中，景观均衡是比纳什均衡更强的概念，但它比强纳什均衡弱。