当前位置: X-MOL 学术J. Math. Econ. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
Journal of Mathematical Economics ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.004
Michel Le Breton , Alexander Shapoval , Shlomo Weber

In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium.

中文翻译:

景观理论的博弈论模型

在本文中,我们研究了 Axelrod 和 Bennett (1993) 引入的景观理论的博弈论概括。在他们的两个小组设置中,每个玩家根据她对小组成员的个人评估总和对小组进行排名。我们扩展了 Axelrod-Bennett 设置,允许任意数量的集团并扩展可能的偏差集以包括多国渐进偏差。我们表明,始终存在不受盈利逐渐偏差影响的帕累托最优景观均衡。我们还指出,虽然在纯策略中,景观均衡是比纳什均衡更强的概念,但它比强纳什均衡弱。
更新日期:2021-01-01
down
wechat
bug