Abstract

In this work, we analyze an evolutionary game that incorporates the ideas presented by Carlo Cipolla in “The fundamental laws of human stupidity”. The game considers four strategies, three of them are inherent to the player behavior and can evolve via imitation dynamics, while the fourth one is associated with an eventual behavior that can be adopted by any player at any time with a certain probability. This fourth strategy corresponds to what Cipolla calls a stupid person. The probability of behaving stupidly acts as a parameter that induces a phase transition in the steady distribution of strategies among the population.

Graphical abstract

中文翻译：

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人类愚蠢的破坏性影响：Cipolla基本定律的修订

摘要

在这项工作中，我们分析了一种进化博弈，其中包含了Carlo Cipolla在“人类愚蠢的基本定律”中提出的思想。该游戏考虑了四种策略，其中三种策略是玩家行为所固有的，并且可以通过模仿动力学来发展，而第四种策略则与最终行为相关联，该行为可以在任何时间以任何概率被任何玩家采用。第四种策略对应于Cipolla所谓的愚蠢的人。行为的愚蠢行为是在人群中策略的稳定分布中诱发相变的参数。

图形概要