We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players are willing to invite their neighbours and also want to incentivize them to invite more players to join. We focus on the monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation relationship as a forest since we require that each player can only accept the invitation at most once. Our goal is to design a solution mechanism to this new cooperative game setting. In this paper, we characterize the weighted permission Shapley value (inspired by permission structure and the weighted Shapley value), which is diffusion incentive compatible, i.e., all players are incentivized to invite their neighbours to join the coalition. Our solution offers the very first attempt to incentivize players to invite more players to form a larger coalition via their private connections, which has many potential applications in other real-world.

中文翻译：

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当玩家有选择权时形成更大联盟的激励措施

我们研究了一个合作游戏设置，其中大联盟可能会改变，因为最初的玩家愿意邀请他们的邻居，也想激励他们邀请更多的玩家加入。我们专注于单调博弈，即在大联盟中加入更多的玩家是无害的。我们将邀请关系建模为森林，因为我们要求每个玩家最多只能接受一次邀请。我们的目标是为这种新的合作游戏设置设计一种解决方案。在本文中，我们描述了加权许可 Shapley 值（受许可结构和加权 Shapley 值的启发），它是扩散激励兼容的，即所有参与者都被激励邀请他们的邻居加入联盟。