当前位置: X-MOL 学术Cogn. Neurosci. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence
Cognitive Neuroscience ( IF 2 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-18 , DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470
Johannes J Fahrenfort 1, 2, 3 , Simon van Gaal 1, 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.



中文翻译:

意识经验理论的标准应该关注机制的解释力,而不是功能对等

摘要

Doerig 和他的同事提出了这样一个概念,即我们需要严格的和理论中立的标准来在意识的经验(机械)理论之间进行仲裁。然而,他们提出的大多数标准都不是理论中立的,因为它们侧重于系统之间的功能等效。因为意识的经验理论是机械论的而不是功能论的,我们认为这些标准在它们之间进行仲裁时没有帮助。

更新日期:2020-11-18
down
wechat
bug