Abstract: In Europe, energy efficiency obligations are imposed on energy retailers competing in liberalized energy markets. They comply by subsidizing energy efficiency investments made by energy end-users from within or outside their customer base. We develop a model describing how competition in the energy market affects compliance strategies. We find that, instead of selecting the most cost-effective investments options, firms may either target their most elastic customers, which enables them to increase their retail price, or their competitor’s customers, which protects their sales. Allowing firms to trade obligations can restore cost-effectiveness, but reduces consumer surplus. Overall, the degree of flexibility that should be incorporated into such programs crucially depends on the degree of heterogeneity across investment costs and the relative weights governments assign to cost-effectiveness and consumer surplus.

中文翻译：

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出售和节省能源：自由化能源市场中的能源效率义务

摘要：在欧洲，对在自由化的能源市场中竞争的能源零售商强加了能效义务。他们通过补贴能源最终用户从其客户群内部或外部进行的能效投资来实现合规。我们开发了一个描述能源市场竞争如何影响合规策略的模型。我们发现，企业可能没有选择最具有成本效益的投资选择，而是针对最有弹性的客户（这使他们能够提高零售价），或者针对竞争对手的客户（从而保护了销售）。允许企业履行义务可以恢复成本效益，但可以减少消费者剩余。总体，