Abstract: Incumbent firms play a decisive role in the success of renewable support policies. Their investments in renewables as well as their operational strategies for their conventional CO2 emitting technologies affect the transition to a sustainable energy system. We use a game theoretical framework to analyze incumbents’ reactions to different renewable support policies, namely feed-in tariff (FIT), feed-in premium (FIP), and auction-based policies. We show that a regulator should choose a support scheme based on concerns about either market power or emission abatement: in FIP-based policies, the incumbent’s strategic behavior leads to lower CO2 emissions, but a higher market price compared to FIT-based policies. Furthermore, for FIP-based policies, the regulator might want to incentivize incumbents directly (to further reduce CO2 emissions) or newcomers (to further reduce market power). Particularly in FIP-based auctions, incumbents have the incentive to obtain all auctioned capacity, which could lead to an unchanged market price despite the entrance of new capacity into the market.

中文翻译：

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任职者的祸根还是收益？电力市场中的可再生支持和战略行为

摘要：现有公司在可再生支持政策的成功中起决定性作用。他们对可再生能源的投资以及其传统的二氧化碳排放技术的运营策略影响着向可持续能源系统的过渡。我们使用博弈论框架分析现有企业对不同可再生支持政策的反应，即上网电价（FIT），上网电价（FIP）和基于拍卖的政策。我们表明，监管机构应基于对市场力量或减排的担忧来选择支持方案：在基于FIP的政策中，在位者的战略行为导致二氧化碳排放量降低，但与基于FIT的政策相比，市场价格更高。此外，对于基于FIP的政策，监管者可能想直接激励现有企业（以进一步减少二氧化碳排放）或新来者（以进一步降低市场力量）。特别是在基于FIP的拍卖中，在位者有获取所有拍卖容量的动机，尽管有新的容量进入市场，这可能导致市场价格不变。