The presence of end-of-life vehicles (ELV) in the cities creates irreparable damage in environmental and economic terms. Thus, governments have been searching for ways to collect ELVs. An effective way to address ELVs is subsidies' policy. In this study, a supply chain including an ELV take-back center, an inspection center, and a repair center are considered. The decision variables are the purchase price of the ELVs, the sale price of the repaired vehicle, and the level of vehicle repair. In this supply chain, the government pays a subsidy to take-back centers that deliver their used vehicles. A Stackelberg game structure is considered with the government as the leader, the inspection center as the primary follower, and the collection and repair centers as the second followers. Using the game theory approach, the effects of government subsidies on equilibrium values of the decision-making variables of the centers in the ELV supply chain have been investigated in three scenarios. The scenarios comprise profit sharing, revenue sharing, and a centralized (cooperative) scenario. The results indicate that the centralized scenario has the most significant advantage compared to the two contracts of profit sharing and cost sharing. For example, the repair level of the ELVs, the amount of repaired vehicles demand, consumer surplus, and the whole supply chain's profit are at their maximum. The most significant impact of subsidy payment is related to the take-back center's profit and the ELV supply. On the other hand, the subsidy does not affect the profit of the repair center.

城市中报废汽车的存在会对环境和经济造成不可挽回的损害。因此，政府一直在寻找收集ELV的方法。解决轻型电动汽车的有效方法是补贴政策。在这项研究中，考虑了包括ELV回收中心，检查中心和维修中心的供应链。决策变量是ELV的购买价格，维修车辆的销售价格以及车辆维修水平。在这个供应链中，政府为运送二手车的回收中心提供补贴。以Stackelberg游戏结构为例，政府为领导者，检查中心为主要关注者，收集和维修中心为第二关注者。使用博弈论方法，在三种情况下，研究了政府补贴对ELV供应链中各中心决策变量均衡值的影响。这些方案包括利润共享，收益共享和集中式（合作）方案。结果表明，与利润共享和成本共享这两个合同相比，集中式方案具有最显着的优势。例如，ELV的维修水平，维修车辆的需求量，消费者剩余以及整个供应链的利润都处于最高水平。补贴支付的最大影响与回收中心的利润和ELV供应有关。另一方面，补贴不影响维修中心的利润。