Abstract Load frequency control (LFC) scheme of modern power systems tends to employ open communication networks to transmit control/measurement signals, which makes the LFC scheme more vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The DoS attack prevents signal transmission and degrades the performance of or even results in instability in the LFC scheme. This paper proposes a switching system-based approach to the LFC scheme of a multi-area power system that is resilient to DoS attacks. After modelling the LFC scheme under DoS attacks as switching subsystems based on the duration of DoS attacks, a new stability criterion in terms of the duration and frequency of DoS attacks is developed. The derived criterion can be used to calculate the maximum duration and frequency of DoS attacks that the LFC system with a given proportional–integral (PI)-type controller can tolerate and to determine the control gains of the PI-type controller for a given duration and frequency of DoS attack. Moreover, a resilient LFC scheme is proposed based on a dual-loop communication channel equipped with the designed PI controller. The effectiveness of the proposed LFC scheme is evaluated on a traditional three-area power system and a deregulated three-area power system under DoS attacks.

中文翻译：

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面向拒绝服务攻击的多区域电力系统基于开关系统的负载频率控制

摘要 现代电力系统的负载频率控制（LFC）方案倾向于采用开放式通信网络来传输控制/测量信号，这使得LFC方案更容易受到拒绝服务（DoS）攻击等网络攻击。DoS 攻击会阻止信号传输并降低 LFC 方案的性能甚至导致其不稳定。本文针对多区域电力系统的 LFC 方案提出了一种基于交换系统的方法，该方案对 DoS 攻击具有弹性。在将 DoS 攻击下的 LFC 方案建模为基于 DoS 攻击持续时间的切换子系统后，就 DoS 攻击的持续时间和频率而言，开发了一个新的稳定性标准。导出的标准可用于计算具有给定比例积分 (PI) 型控制器的 LFC 系统可以容忍的 DoS 攻击的最大持续时间和频率，并确定给定持续时间的 PI 型控制器的控制增益和 DoS 攻击的频率。此外，基于配备设计的 PI 控制器的双回路通信通道，提出了一种弹性 LFC 方案。在 DoS 攻击下，在传统的三区域电力系统和解除管制的三区域电力系统上评估了所提出的 LFC 方案的有效性。基于配备设计的 PI 控制器的双回路通信通道，提出了一种弹性 LFC 方案。在 DoS 攻击下，在传统的三区域电力系统和放松管制的三区域电力系统上评估了所提出的 LFC 方案的有效性。基于配备设计的 PI 控制器的双回路通信通道，提出了一种弹性 LFC 方案。在 DoS 攻击下，在传统的三区域电力系统和放松管制的三区域电力系统上评估了所提出的 LFC 方案的有效性。