Due to the revelations of global-scale pervasive surveillance programs, Internet users have an increasing demand for privacy. However, this is usually undesirable for network service providers because attackers would be able to anonymize themselves and avoid regulation while conducting network attacks. Therefore, network service providers want to hold users accountable and it has been widely considered as a tussle to find a good balance point between the accountability and privacy for the Internet. In this work, we first show that existing representative approaches mainly suffer from narrow-range accountability, low efficiency or risky key management. Motivated by these observations, we propose an efficient network layer protocol called APGS to balance the accountability and privacy. At the core of our APGS is the group signature which, however, is not trivial to apply for the network layer mainly due to the efficiency, revocation, and privacy issues. We manage to overcome these challenges via proposing some novel approaches, including challenge-based cache strategy, scalable verifier-local revocation strategy, and Onion-then-Case strategy. We then evaluate the efficiency of APGS and conclude that in our environment, APGS can generate packets up to 20k pkts/s on a desktop and achieve approximately 80% of IP's goodput at most on a software router.

中文翻译：

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APGS：网络层高效的源可问责和元数据私有协议


由于全球范围内普遍存在的监控计划的曝光，互联网用户对隐私的需求日益增长。然而，这对于网络服务提供商来说通常是不受欢迎的，因为攻击者在进行网络攻击时可以匿名并逃避监管。因此，网络服务提供商希望让用户承担责任，而在互联网的责任和隐私之间找到一个良好的平衡点被广泛认为是一场斗争。在这项工作中，我们首先表明现有的代表性方法主要存在责任范围窄、效率低或密钥管理风险等问题。受这些观察的启发，我们提出了一种名为 APGS 的高效网络层协议来平衡责任和隐私。我们 APGS 的核心是群签名，然而，由于效率、撤销和隐私问题，群签名应用于网络层并不简单。我们通过提出一些新颖的方法来克服这些挑战，包括基于挑战的缓存策略、可扩展的验证者本地撤销策略和 Onion-then-Case 策略。然后我们评估 APGS 的效率并得出结论：在我们的环境中，APGS 在桌面上可以生成高达 20k pkts/s 的数据包，并且最多可以在软件路由器上实现大约 80% 的 IP 吞吐量。