After the publication of Begriffsschrift, a conflict erupted between Frege and Schröder regarding their respective logical systems which emerged around the Leibnizian notions of lingua characterica and calculus ratiocinator. Both of them claimed their own logic to be a better realisation of Leibniz’s ideal language and considered the rival system a mere calculus ratiocinator. Inspired by this polemic, van Heijenoort (1967b) distinguished two conceptions of logic—logic as language and logic as calculus—and presented them as opposing views, but did not explain Frege’s and Schröder’s conceptions of the fulfilment of Leibniz’s scientific ideal.In this paper I explain the reasons for Frege’s and Schröder’s mutual accusations of having created a mere calculus ratiocinator. On the one hand, Schröder’s construction of the algebra of relatives fits with a project for the reduction of any mathematical concept to the notion of relative. From this stance I argue that he deemed the formal system of Begriffsschrift incapable of such a reduction. On the other hand, first I argue that Frege took Boolean logic to be an abstract logical theory inadequate for the rendering of specific content; then I claim that the language of Begriffsschrift did not constitute a complete lingua characterica by itself, more being seen by Frege as a tool that could be applied to scientific disciplines. Accordingly, I argue that Frege’s project of constructing a lingua characterica was not tied to his later logicist programme.

中文翻译：

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语言特征和微积分比例因子：弗雷格-施罗德辩论的莱布尼兹背景

发表后初稿，弗雷格和施罗德之间就围绕莱布尼兹的概念出现的各自的逻辑系统爆发了冲突语言特征和微积分推理器. 他们都声称自己的逻辑是对莱布尼茨理想语言的更好实现，并认为竞争对手的系统仅仅是微积分推理器. 受这一论战的启发，van Heijenoort (1967b) 区分了两种逻辑概念——作为语言的逻辑和作为微积分的逻辑——并将它们呈现为相反的观点，但没有解释弗雷格和施罗德关于实现莱布尼茨科学理想的概念。我解释了弗雷格和施罗德相互指责创造了一个单纯的微积分推理器. 一方面，Schröder 对亲属代数的构建符合将任何数学概念简化为亲属概念的计划。从这个立场，我认为他认为初稿无法做到这样的减少。另一方面，首先我认为弗雷格认为布尔逻辑是一种抽象的逻辑理论，不足以呈现具体的内容；然后我声称初稿不构成完整语言特征就其本身而言，弗雷格更多地将其视为可以应用于科学学科的工具。因此，我认为弗雷格关于构建一个语言特征与他后来的逻辑主义纲领无关。