Prediction markets are powerful tools to elicit and aggregate beliefs from strategic agents. However, in current prediction markets, agents may exhaust the social welfare by competing to be the first to update the market. We initiate the study of the trade-off between how quickly information is aggregated by the market, and how much this information costs. We design markets to aggregate timely information from strategic agents to maximize social welfare. To this end, the market must incentivize agents to invest the correct amount of effort to acquire information: quickly enough to be useful, but not faster (and more expensively) than necessary. The market also must ensure that agents report their information truthfully and on time. We consider two settings: in the first, information is only valuable before a deadline; in the second, the value of information decreases as time passes. We use both theorems and simulations to demonstrate the mechanisms.

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来自预测市场的及时信息

预测市场是从战略代理人那里引出和聚合信念的强大工具。然而，在当前的预测市场中，代理可能会通过竞争成为第一个更新市场来耗尽社会福利。我们开始研究市场汇总信息的速度与这些信息的成本之间的权衡。我们设计市场来汇总来自战略代理人的及时信息，以最大限度地提高社会福利。为此，市场必须激励代理人投入正确的努力来获取信息：足够快以获取有用信息，但不能比必要的更快（并且更昂贵）。市场还必须确保代理商如实及时地报告他们的信息。我们考虑两种情况：第一，信息只有在截止日期前才有价值；在第二，信息的价值随着时间的推移而降低。我们使用定理和模拟来演示这些机制。