Our ability to evaluate an experience retrospectively is important because it allows us to summarize its total value, and this summary value can then later be used as a guide in deciding whether the experience merits repeating, or whether instead it should rather be avoided. However, when an experience unfolds over time, humans tend to assign disproportionate weight to the later part of the experience, and this can lead to poor choice in repeating, or avoiding experience. Using model-based computational analyses of fMRI recordings in 27 male volunteers, we show that the human brain encodes the summary value of an extended sequence of outcomes in two distinct reward representations. We find that the overall experienced value is encoded accurately in the amygdala, but its merit is excessively marked down by disincentive anterior insula activity if the sequence of experienced outcomes declines temporarily. Moreover, the statistical strength of this neural code can separate efficient decision-makers from suboptimal decision-makers. Optimal decision-makers encode overall value more strongly, and suboptimal decision-makers encode the disincentive markdown (DM) more strongly. The separate neural implementation of the two distinct reward representations confirms that suboptimal choice for temporally extended outcomes can be the result of robust neural representation of a displeasing aspect of the experience such as temporary decline.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT One of the numerous foibles that prompt us to make poor decisions is known as the "Banker's fallacy," the tendency to focus on short-term growth at the expense of long-term value. This effect leads to unwarranted preference for happy endings. Here, we show that the anterior insula in the human brain marks down the overall value of an experience as it unfolds over time if the experience entails a sequence of predominantly negative temporal contrasts. By contrast, the amygdala encodes overall value accurately. These results provide neural indices for the dichotomy of decision utility and experienced utility popularized as Thinking fast and slow by Daniel Kahneman.

我们回顾性评估一次经历的能力很重要，因为它使我们能够总结其总价值，然后可以将这个总结价值用作决定该经历是否值得重复或是否应该避免的指南。然而，当一段经历随着时间的推移而展开时，人们往往会过度重视该经历的后期部分，这可能会导致在重复或避免经历时做出错误的选择。通过对 27 名男性志愿者的功能磁共振成像记录进行基于模型的计算分析，我们发现人脑以两种不同的奖励表示形式对扩展结果序列的汇总值进行编码。我们发现，整体体验值在杏仁核中被准确编码，但如果体验结果的序列暂时下降，其优点会因抑制前岛叶活动而过度降低。此外，该神经代码的统计强度可以将高效决策者与次优决策者区分开来。最优决策者对整体价值的编码更强烈，次优决策者对抑制性降价 (DM) 的编码更强烈。两种不同的奖励表示的单独神经实现证实，对于暂时​​延长的结果的次优选择可能是对体验中令人不快的方面（例如暂时下降）的稳健神经表示的结果。

意义陈述促使我们做出错误决策的众多缺陷之一被称为“银行家谬论”，即注重短期增长而忽视长期价值的倾向。这种效应导致人们对美好结局的无理偏爱。在这里，我们表明，如果体验涉及一系列主要为负面的时间对比，则人脑中的前岛叶会随着时间的推移而展现体验的整体价值。相比之下，杏仁核可以准确地编码整体价值。这些结果为决策效用和经验效用的二分法提供了神经指标，这种二分法被丹尼尔·卡尼曼（Daniel Kahneman）称为“快思考”和“慢思考” 。