We address the mechanism design problem of an exchange setting suitable make– take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal–agent approach, we provide the optimal compensation scheme of a market maker in quasi‐explicit form. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract. We show in particular that it improves liquidity and reduces trading costs for investors. We extend our study to an oligopoly of symmetric exchanges and we study the impact of such common agency policy on the system.

中文翻译：

---

进行市场调节的最佳制造费

我们解决了交易所设置合适的make-takes费用以吸引平台流动性的机制设计问题。使用委托-代理方法，我们以准显式形式提供了做市商的最优补偿方案。该合同主要取决于做市商的库存轨迹和资产的波动性。我们还提供做市商应显示的最佳报价。公式的简单性使我们可以详细分析与没有合同的情况相比，通过交易所进行的最佳合同的效果。我们特别表明，它可以改善流动性并降低投资者的交易成本。我们将研究扩展到对称交易的寡头垄断，并研究这种共同代理政策对系统的影响。