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Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-01 , DOI: arxiv-2011.00498
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Ori Zviran

We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of interdependent values (IDV). It is well-known that in multi-item settings with private values, correlated values can lead to bad PoA, which can be polynomially large in the number of agents $n$. In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large even in single-item settings. On the positive side, we identify a natural condition on information dispersion in the market, termed $\gamma$-heterogeneity, which enables good PoA guarantees. Under this condition, we show that for single-item settings, the PoA of standard mechanisms degrades gracefully with $\gamma$. For settings with $m>1$ items we show a separation between two domains: If $n \geq m$, we devise a new simultaneous item auction with good PoA (with respect to $\gamma$), under limited information asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first positive PoA result for correlated values in multi-item settings. The main technical difficulty in establishing this result is that the standard tool for establishing PoA results -- the smoothness framework -- is unsuitable for IDV settings, and so we must introduce new techniques to address the unique challenges imposed by such settings. In the domain of $n \ll m$, we establish impossibility results even for surprisingly simple scenarios.

中文翻译:

具有相互依存价值的简单拍卖的无政府状态的价格

通过考虑具有相关值的设置,我们扩展了关于同步物品拍卖的无政府状态 (PoA) 价格的文献;我们通过相互依存价值(IDV)的基本经济模型来做到这一点。众所周知,在具有私有值的多项目设置中,相关值会导致错误的 PoA,这在代理数 $n$ 中可能是多项式大的。在更通用的 IDV 模型中,我们表明即使在单项设置中,PoA 也可以是多项式大的。从积极的方面来说,我们确定了市场中信息分散的自然条件,称为 $\gamma$-异质性,它可以实现良好的 PoA 保证。在这种情况下,我们表明对于单项设置,标准机制的 PoA 会随着 $\gamma$ 优雅地降级。对于 $m>1$ 项目的设置,我们显示了两个域之间的分隔:如果 $n \geq m$,我们在有限的信息不对称下设计了一个具有良好 PoA(相对于 $\gamma$)的新的同步物品拍卖。据我们所知,这是多项目设置中相关值的第一个正 PoA 结果。建立这个结果的主要技术难点是建立 PoA 结果的标准工具——平滑框架——不适合 IDV 设置,因此我们必须引入新技术来解决此类设置带来的独特挑战。在 $n \ll m$ 的域中,即使对于非常简单的场景,我们也建立了不可能的结果。这是多项目设置中相关值的第一个正 PoA 结果。建立这个结果的主要技术难点是建立 PoA 结果的标准工具——平滑框架——不适合 IDV 设置,因此我们必须引入新技术来解决此类设置带来的独特挑战。在 $n \ll m$ 的域中,即使对于非常简单的场景,我们也建立了不可能的结果。这是多项目设置中相关值的第一个正 PoA 结果。建立这个结果的主要技术难点是建立 PoA 结果的标准工具——平滑框架——不适合 IDV 设置,因此我们必须引入新技术来解决此类设置带来的独特挑战。在 $n \ll m$ 的域中,即使对于非常简单的场景,我们也建立了不可能的结果。
更新日期:2020-11-03
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