In order to decrease environment pollution and the usage of raw material, some governments use subsidy policy to encourage the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and the Independent Remanufacturer (IR) to remanufacture. While, how government subsidy affects remanufacturing activity and industry competition is still unclear. In our research, there are an OEM and an IR in the market. And the OEM and the IR have three different choices of remanufacturing: no-remanufacturing, remanufacturing part, and remanufacturing all. This research builds a game-theoretic model to discuss the impact of government subsidy on manufacturing and remanufacturing quantities, consumer surplus, OEM and IR profit, social surplus and environment for each choice of the OEM and the IR. The result shows that the amount of the OEM remanufacturing decreases with government subsidy when the OEM remanufactures all but the IR remanufactures part. OEM and IR profit, and consumer surplus may decrease with government subsidy in some competitive markets. Total social surplus may also decrease in government subsidy when OEM-IR competition exists in a remanufactured market or only the IR remanufactures part. The change of the total environment impact depends on the relative environment impact of unit manufactured and remanufactured product when OEM or IR remanufactures part. Thus, it is not always a great strategy for policy makers to only increase government subsidy in order to decrease environment pollution and improve social surplus. Before increasing government subsidy, policy makers need to more learn about the competitive markets and environment impact per unit product. Finally, numerical study is conducted to confirm these findings, discuss what happens when the willingness-to-pay of consumers for remanufactured products changes, and analyze the impact of different levels of environment impact per remanufactured product on total environment.

为了减少环境污染和原材料使用，一些政府采用补贴政策鼓励原始设备制造商（OEM）和独立再制造商（IR）再制造。虽然，政府补贴如何影响再制造活动和行业竞争仍不清楚。在我们的研究中，市场上有OEM和IR。OEM和IR具有三种不同的再制造选择：无再制造，零件再制造和全部再制造。这项研究建立了一个博弈论模型，讨论了政府补贴对制造商和再制造数量，消费者剩余，OEM和IR利润，社会剩余以及每种OEM和IR选择环境的影响。结果表明，除IR再制造部分外，OEM再制造中的所有部分都随着政府补贴而减少。在某些竞争性市场中，OEM和IR利润以及消费者剩余可能会随着政府补贴而减少。当再制造市场中存在OEM-IR竞争或仅IR再制造部分存在OEM-IR竞争时，社会补贴总额也可能减少。总环境影响的变化取决于OEM或IR再制造零件时单位制造和再制造产品的相对环境影响。因此，决策者仅增加政府补贴以减少环境污染和改善社会剩余并不总是一个好策略。在增加政府补贴之前，决策者需要更多地了解竞争产品和单位产品对环境的影响。最后，进行数值研究以证实这些发现，讨论当消费者对再制造产品的支付意愿发生变化时会发生什么，并分析每个再制造产品对环境的不同程度的影响对整个环境的影响。