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Uniform-price auctions in staffing for self-scheduling service
IISE Transactions ( IF 2.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-04 , DOI: 10.1080/24725854.2020.1841345
Yanling Chang 1, 2 , Lu Sun 2 , Matthew F. Keblis 3 , Jie Yang 1
Affiliation  

Abstract

This research examines a uniform-price auction mechanism in managing staffing for self-scheduling business such as task sourcing and work-from-home call centers. We consider two types of service providers: Type-1 agents who require advanced notice before a shift starts and Type-2 agents who are flexible enough to be scheduled on-demand. We develop an integrated framework that can jointly analyze demand forecast, short-term scheduling, and long-term planning of staff capacity. We discuss the adoption of a blended workforce in scheduling and the implication of attrition costs in the long-term staffing. In addition, we compare the auction model with a popular fixed-wage model, in order to examine under what conditions the auction model is preferred. These results provide insights to staff managers on the choice of staffing and wage models.



中文翻译:

进行人手安排服务的统一价格拍卖

摘要

这项研究探讨了一种统一价格拍卖机制,用于管理诸如任务采购和在家工作的呼叫中心之类的自调度业务的人员编制。我们考虑两种类型的服务提供商:类型1的代理,他们需要在轮班开始之前提前通知;类型2的代理,它们的灵活性足以按需调度。我们开发了一个集成框架,可以共同分析需求预测,短期计划和员工能力的长期计划。我们讨论在日程安排中采用混合型劳动力以及长期人员配备中的减员成本。此外,我们将拍卖模型与流行的固定工资模型进行了比较,以研究在什么条件下优先选择拍卖模型。这些结果为员工经理提供有关人员配备和工资模型选择的见解。

更新日期:2020-12-04
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