Abstract The common pool resource (CPR) theory has made invaluable contributions to the governance of natural resources in the past decades, but few literatures have specifically paid attention to the different property right arrangements of resource system and resource units, and their relationship. In this paper, we take two types of grassland property right system on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (QTP) in China, one is grassland contract system under that the previous grassland common use was given up and the other is grazing quota system under that the common use is still kept in the community level, as cases to present the different consequences on the ecological conditions, herders’ livelihoods and livestock husbandry. Furthermore, from the perspective of property rights of resource system-units, we explore why the two systems resulted in the different consequences. We find that the grazing quota system indicated by the number of livestock each household allowed to raise has more advantages in improving the herders’ livelihoods and reducing the livestock production costs, and both systems could alleviate the grazing pressure though the long-term effects of the contract system might be negative on ecological conditions. The main reason why the grazing quota system works better is that this type of individual use rights were clarified based on the resource units so the grassland could be kept common use as an integrated resource system, while the contract system was claimed by physically dividing the resource system by fencing, thus the resource system was fragmented which led to mismatch with the large scope movement needs of livestock grazing. We argue that, theoretically, the grazing quota system is a private property rights embedded in the grassland common property right system, which forms a nested property right regime. Our findings have important implications for both of the CPR theory and practical rangeland management worldwide.

中文翻译：

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公地的嵌套产权制度：资源系统-单位的视角

摘要 公共池资源（CPR）理论在过去几十年中为自然资源的治理做出了不可估量的贡献，但很少有文献专门关注资源系统和资源单位的不同产权安排及其相互关系。在本文中，我国青藏高原草原产权制度有两种，一种是放弃原有草地公用的草地承包制，另一种是放牧定额制共同使用仍然保留在社区层面，作为对生态条件、牧民生计和畜牧业的不同后果的案例。再者，从资源系统单位产权的角度来看，我们探讨了为什么这两个系统会导致不同的后果。我们发现以每户允许饲养的牲畜数量表示的放牧配额制度在改善牧民生计和降低畜牧生产成本方面更具优势，并且两种制度都可以通过长期影响缓解放牧压力。合同制度可能对生态条件不利。放牧定额制效果较好的主要原因是，这种个人使用权是以资源单位为基础的，这样草原可以作为一个综合资源系统来共同使用，而承包制则是通过对资源进行物理分割来主张的。通过围栏系统，因此，资源系统是支离破碎的，导致与牲畜放牧的大范围移动需求不匹配。我们认为，从理论上讲，放牧配额制度是嵌入在草原共有产权制度中的一种私有产权，它形成了一个嵌套的产权制度。我们的研究结果对 CPR 理论和世界范围内的实际牧场管理都具有重要意义。