In this paper, we propose a simple oligopoly game model to represent the interactions between coalitions of countries in deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies in a steady-state net-zero emission climate regime that could take place by the end of the twenty-first century. The emission quotas and CDR activities obtained in the solution of this steady-state model could then be used as a target for end-of-period conditions in a dynamic integrated assessment analysis studying the transition to 2100. More precisely, we analyze a steady-state situation where m coalitions exist and behave as m players in a game of supplying emission rights on an international emission trading system. The quotas supplied by a coalition must correspond to the amount of CO₂ captured through CDR activities in the corresponding world region. We use an extension of the computable general equilibrium model GEMINI-E3 to calibrate the payoff functions and compute an equilibrium solution in the noncooperative game.

在本文中，我们提出了一个简单的寡头博弈模型，以代表国家联盟在稳定的净零排放气候体系中部署二氧化碳清除（CDR）策略时的相互作用，这种情况可能在20世纪末发生。一世纪。然后，在研究过渡到2100的动态综合评估分析中，可以将该稳态模型的解决方案中获得的排放配额和CDR活性用作期末条件的目标。更准确地说，我们分析了在国际排放权交易系统上提供排放权的博弈中，存在m个联盟并以m个参与者的身份行事的状态。联盟提供的配额必须对应于CO ₂的量通过相应世界区域的CDR活动捕获。我们使用可计算的一般均衡模型GEMINI-E3的扩展来校准收益函数，并计算非合作博弈中的均衡解。