RFID tag corruption is a powerful attack on RFID systems, especially when it reveals the tag's temporary state. Under such an attack, no RFID scheme can achieve both security and privacy if the tags are not endowed with some hardware primitives, such as physically unclonable functions (PUFs), to prevent adversarial access to secret information. However, the use of such primitives does not constitute a guarantee for security and privacy because they do not substitute a good RFID system design. In this paper a general technique is proposed, to translate any (PUF-based) RFID scheme that is secure and private under corruption without temporary state disclosure into a PUF-based RFID scheme that is secure and private under corruption with temporary state disclosure. Our technique is optimal with respect to the tag overhead induced by PUFs. The technique is richly exemplified on both RFID and PUF-based RFID schemes. As a notable result, the first PUF-based RFID scheme is obtained, that is secure and forward private, but not destructive private, under corruption with temporary state disclosure. By using our technique, some flawed PUF-based RFID schemes that have been proposed so far in the literature can be fixed.

中文翻译：

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PUF 保护变量：临时状态披露腐败下的 RFID 安全和隐私解决方案


RFID 标签损坏是对 RFID 系统的一种强大攻击，尤其是当它暴露标签的临时状态时。在这种攻击下，如果标签不具备某些硬件原语（例如物理不可克隆功能（PUF））以防止对秘密信息的敌对访问，则任何 RFID 方案都无法同时实现安全性和隐私性。然而，使用此类原语并不构成安全和隐私的保证，因为它们不能替代良好的 RFID 系统设计。本文提出了一种通用技术，将任何在没有临时状态公开的腐败情况下安全和私密的（基于PUF的）RFID方案转换为在有临时状态公开的腐败情况下安全和私密的基于PUF的RFID方案。我们的技术对于 PUF 引起的标签开销而言是最佳的。该技术在 RFID 和基于 PUF 的 RFID 方案中都有丰富的例证。一个显着的结果是，获得了第一个基于 PUF 的 RFID 方案，该方案是安全且前向私有的，但在临时状态披露的腐败情况下不是破坏性私有的。通过使用我们的技术，可以修复迄今为止文献中提出的一些有缺陷的基于 PUF 的 RFID 方案。