Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy auction, which allow multiple goods to be sold simultaneously and any combination of goods to be bid and the maximum sum of combinations of bidding prices to be calculated. However, in traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation since the winner determination problem needs to be resolved in terms of sensitive data as above. In order to solve this issue, this paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which we design a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid to enable the auctioneer to pick out the largest bid without revealing any information about bids. Moreover, we design and employ three subprotocols, namely, privacy-preserving winner determination protocol, privacy-preserving scalar protocol, and privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol, to implement the combinatorial auction with bidder privacy and payment verifiability. The results of comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides a better efficiency and flexibility to meet different types of data volume in terms of the number of goods and bidders.

中文翻译：

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PP-VCA：一种可保护隐私且可验证的组合拍卖机制

组合拍卖可用于频谱拍卖，网络路由，铁路网段和能源拍卖等领域，该领域允许同时出售多种商品，并允许对商品的任何组合进行出价，并且对出价组合的最大和进行拍卖。计算。但是，在传统的组合拍卖机制中，有关投标人的价格和捆绑的数据可能会透露敏感信息，例如个人喜好和竞争关系，因为需要根据上述敏感数据解决中标者确定问题。为了解决这个问题，本文采用了一种隐私保护和可验证的组合拍卖协议（PP-VCA）以保护投标人的隐私并以安全的方式确保正确的拍卖价格，我们设计了一种单向递增功能来保护投标人的投标，使拍卖人能够在不透露任何投标信息的情况下选择最大的投标。此外，我们设计并采用了三个子协议，即隐私保护赢家确定协议，隐私保护标量协议和隐私保护可验证支付确定协议。，以实现投标人隐私和付款可验证性的组合拍卖。综合实验评估的结果表明，我们提出的方案提供了更好的效率和灵活性，可以根据商品和投标人的数量来满足不同类型的数据量。