Abstract This paper proposes two-stage stochastic models to enable wind power producers (WPPs) and energy storage systems (ESSs) to participate in simultaneous day-ahead energy, spinning reserve, and frequency regulation markets. Unlike previous works, which focused on the WPP benefits, this paper investigates the participation risk and economic profits for both the WPP and the ESS in various operation strategies. Multiple sources of uncertainties are modelled in this paper. Furthermore, a risk management analysis has been done to show the effect of the risk aversion degree on the participation of the facilities. Penalty factors that were assumed as definite amounts in the literature are defined proportional to energy imbalances to penalize the deviation. A set of case studies are designed to compare individual benefits of the ESS and WPP when participating in the day-ahead markets, considering transmission tariffs. The results show that the joint operation can increase the profit by 4% and 34% in comparison with the separate and backup operations, respectively. However, considering the transmission tariffs may reduce the profit of joint operation by 19.5%. A sensitivity analysis is also performed to show how the penalty factors can have impacts on the participation of ESSs and WPPs in the markets.

中文翻译：

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风电生产商和储能系统的风险约束随机市场运行策略

摘要 本文提出了两阶段随机模型，使风电生产商 (WPP) 和储能系统 (ESS) 能够同时参与日前能源、旋转备用和频率调节市场。与以往关注 WPP 收益的工作不同，本文研究了 WPP 和 ESS 在各种运营策略中的参与风险和经济利润。本文模拟了多种不确定性来源。此外，还进行了风险管理分析，以显示风险规避程度对设施参与度的影响。在文献中假设为确定数量的惩罚因子被定义为与能量不平衡成正比以惩罚偏差。一组案例研究旨在比较 ESS 和 WPP 在参与日前市场时的个人收益，并考虑传输关税。结果表明，联合经营比分离经营和备份经营分别可以提高4%和34%的利润。然而，考虑到输电关税可能会使联合运营的利润减少19.5%。还进行了敏感性分析，以显示惩罚因素如何影响 ESS 和 WPP 在市场中的参与。考虑到输电关税可能会使联合经营的利润减少19.5%。还进行了敏感性分析，以显示惩罚因素如何影响 ESS 和 WPP 在市场中的参与。考虑到输电关税可能会使联合经营的利润减少19.5%。还进行了敏感性分析，以显示惩罚因素如何影响 ESS 和 WPP 在市场中的参与。