We investigate the bargaining equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The newsvendor-like retailer can borrow from a bank or use the supplier's trade credit to fund his business. In the presence of bankruptcy risk for both the supplier and retailer, with a wholesale price contract, we model the player's strategic interactions under the Nash and Rubinstein bargaining games. In both financing schemes, the Nash bargaining game overcomes the double marginalization effect under the Stackelberg game and achieves supply chain coordination. The Rubinstein bargaining game realizes the Pareto improvement of the supply chain. The player with stronger bargaining power always prefers to initially offer a contract under the Rubinstein bargaining game to obtain greater expected profit. Furthermore, we characterize the conditions under which bargaining power and discount factor affect the bargaining equilibrium. We numerically verify our theoretical results.

中文翻译：

---

具有资本约束的零售商的两级供应链中的讨价还价均衡

我们研究了由供应商和受资本约束的零售商组成的两级供应链中的讨价还价均衡。像新闻卖主一样的零售商可以从银行借款，也可以使用供应商的贸易信贷为其业务提供资金。在供应商和零售商都面临破产风险的情况下，通过签订批发价合同，我们在纳什和鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价游戏下为玩家的战略互动建模。在这两种融资方案中，纳什讨价还价博弈都克服了Stackelberg博弈下的双重边缘化效应，并实现了供应链协调。鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价游戏实现了帕累托对供应链的改善。具有较强议价能力的玩家总是喜欢在Rubinstein议价博弈中最初提供合同，以获得更大的预期利润。此外，我们描述了议价能力和折扣因子影响议价均衡的条件。我们用数字验证了我们的理论结果。