The process of CEO incentive and supervision, in which the special committee plays an important role, has always been a hard problem to solve in modern corporate governance. Considering the conflicts of interest between the compensation committee, audit committee, and the CEO, this paper constructed a game model of incentive and supervision within the board of directors and analysed the strategic choices of all three and the influencing mechanisms in different contexts. The results show that there is no totally stable strategy point in the system and that there are different strategy choices in different situations; the CEO’s strategy choice is influenced by both the compensation committee and the audit committee, the incentive strategy of the compensation committee will promote the CEO’s self-interested behaviour, and the supervision strategy of the audit committee is inhibitive. The function of the special committee is dependent on its initial intention and the intensity of action. In the situation of excessive incentive by the compensation committee, the strategy choice of audit committee has periodicity, and the CEO and audit committee have periodic discretionary choice game. This study provides insight into the internal governance of the board of directors, particularly special committees, which create the incentive and supervisory contracts.

中文翻译：

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基于演化博弈模型的专门委员会与首席执行官之间的激励与监督契约

在专门的委员会中发挥重要作用的CEO激励和监督过程一直是现代公司治理中难以解决的问题。考虑到薪酬委员会，审计委员会与首席执行官之间的利益冲突，本文在董事会内部构建了激励与监督的博弈模型，并分析了这三个方面的战略选择以及不同背景下的影响机制。结果表明，系统中没有完全稳定的策略点，不同情况下策略选择也不同。CEO的策略选择受薪酬委员会和审计委员会的影响，薪酬委员会的激励策略将促进CEO的私利行为，审计委员会的监督策略是抑制性的。特别委员会的职能取决于其最初意图和行动强度。在薪酬委员会激励过度的情况下，审计委员会的战略选择具有周期性，CEO和审计委员会具有周期性的自由选择博弈。这项研究提供了对董事会，特别是专门委员会的内部治理的洞察力，这些委员会创建了激励和监督合同。首席执行官和审计委员会定期进行自由选择游戏。这项研究提供了对董事会，特别是专门委员会的内部治理的洞察力，这些委员会创建了激励和监督合同。首席执行官和审计委员会定期进行自由选择游戏。这项研究提供了对董事会，特别是专门委员会的内部治理的洞察力，这些委员会创建了激励和监督合同。