Abstract This study investigates the impact of different price leadership structures on the efficacy of manufacturer advertising, retailer advertising, and cooperative advertising in a dual-exclusive channel system that may differ in market size. Our analysis indicates that without cost sharing, advertising efficiency is the highest when an advertiser is in the leader’s position. The previous literature has discussed a cost-sharing rate determined by a single-channel member excessively, but we find that the endogenous cost-sharing rate is not capable of coordinating the entire supply chain system. Bargaining solutions are proposed to solve the incoordination issue, in which a manufacturer and a retailer cooperate to determine the cost-sharing rate. Our analysis suggests that the proposed bargaining model is an effective coordination mechanism. Most notably, the range of optimal cost-sharing rate under manufacturer advertising with cost sharing appears to be quite close to marketing practices.

中文翻译：

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竞争供应链中的广告和权力结构

摘要 本研究调查了不同价格领导结构对制造商广告、零售商广告和合作广告在市场规模可能不同的双独家渠道系统中的效果的影响。我们的分析表明，在没有成本分摊的情况下，当广告主处于领先地位时，广告效率最高。以往的文献过度讨论了单一渠道成员决定的成本分摊率，但我们发现内生成本分摊率并不能协调整个供应链系统。议价方案被提出来解决不协调问题，其中制造商和零售商合作确定成本分摊率。我们的分析表明，提议的谈判模式是一种有效的协调机制。