We investigate second-price sequential auctions of unit-demand bidders with time-variable valuations under complete information. We describe how a bidder figures willingness to pay by calculating option values, and show that when bidders bid their option value, and a condition of consistency is fulfilled, a subgame-perfect equilibrium is the result. With no constraints on valuations, equilibria are not necessarily efficient, but we show that when bidder valuations satisfy a certain constraint, an efficient equilibrium always exists. This result may be extended to a model with arrivals of bidders. We show how the equilibrium allocation, bids, and bidder utilities are calculated in the general case. We prove constructively that a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium always exists, and show how all pure equilibria can be found by the method of option values

中文翻译：

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具有时变估值的连续拍卖中的期权价值

我们研究了在完全信息下具有时变估值的单位需求投标人的第二价格顺序拍卖。我们描述了投标者如何通过计算期权价值来计算支付意愿，并表明当投标者投标他们的期权价值并且满足一致性条件时，结果是子博弈完美均衡。由于对估值没有限制，均衡不一定是有效的，但我们表明，当投标人估值满足某个约束时，有效均衡总是存在的。这个结果可以扩展到有投标人到达的模型。我们展示了在一般情况下如何计算均衡分配、投标和投标人效用。我们建设性地证明一个纯粹的子博弈完美均衡总是存在的，