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Investigating the Adoption of Hybrid Encrypted Cloud Data Deduplication with Game Theory
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems ( IF 5.6 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-01 , DOI: 10.1109/tpds.2020.3028685
Xueqin Liang , Zheng Yan , Robert Deng , Qinghua Zheng

Encrypted data deduplication, along with different preferences in data access control, brings the birth of hybrid encrypted cloud data deduplication (H-DEDU for short). However, whether H-DEDU can be successfully deployed in practice has not been seriously investigated. Obviously, the adoption of H-DEDU depends on whether it can bring economic benefits to all stakeholders. But existing economic models of cloud storage fail to support H-DEDU due to complicated interactions among stakeholders. In this article, we establish a formal economic model of H-DEDU by formulating the utilities of all involved stakeholders, i.e., data holders, data owners, and Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). Then, we construct a multi-stage Stackelberg game, which consists of Holder Participation Game, Owner Online Game, and CSP Pricing Game, to capture the interactions among all system stakeholders. We further analyze the conditions of the existence of a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium and propose a gradient-based algorithm to help the stakeholders choose near-optimal strategies. Extensive experiments show the feasibility of the proposed algorithm in achieving the Nash Equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Additionally, we investigate the effects of parameters related to CSP, data owners and data holders on H-DEDU adoption. Our study advises all stakeholders the best strategies to adopt H-DEDU.

中文翻译:

使用博弈论调查混合加密云重复数据删除的采用

加密重复数据删除,以及数据访问控制的不同偏好,带来了混合加密云重复数据删除(简称H-DEDU)的诞生。然而,H-DEDU是否能在实践中成功部署并没有得到认真研究。显然,H-DEDU 的采用取决于它能否为所有利益相关者带来经济效益。但由于利益相关者之间的复杂交互,现有的云存储经济模型无法支持 H-DEDU。在本文中,我们通过制定所有相关利益相关者(即数据持有者、数据所有者和云存储提供商 (CSP))的效用来建立 H-DEDU 的正式经济模型。然后,我们构建了一个多阶段的 Stackelberg 博弈,它由持有人参与博弈、所有者在线博弈和 CSP 定价博弈组成,捕捉所有系统利益相关者之间的相互作用。我们进一步分析了子博弈完美纳什均衡存在的条件,并提出了一种基于梯度的算法来帮助利益相关者选择接近最优的策略。大量实验表明所提出的算法在实现 Stackelberg 博弈的纳什均衡方面的可行性。此外,我们调查了与 CSP、数据所有者和数据持有者相关的参数对 H-DEDU 采用的影响。我们的研究建议所有利益相关者采用 H-DEDU 的最佳策略。大量实验表明所提出的算法在实现 Stackelberg 博弈的纳什均衡方面的可行性。此外,我们调查了与 CSP、数据所有者和数据持有者相关的参数对 H-DEDU 采用的影响。我们的研究建议所有利益相关者采用 H-DEDU 的最佳策略。大量实验表明所提出的算法在实现 Stackelberg 博弈的纳什均衡方面的可行性。此外,我们调查了与 CSP、数据所有者和数据持有者相关的参数对 H-DEDU 采用的影响。我们的研究建议所有利益相关者采用 H-DEDU 的最佳策略。
更新日期:2021-03-01
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