Shared resource extraction among profit-seeking individuals involves a tension between individual benefit and the collective well-being represented by the persistence of the resource. Many game theoretic models explore this scenario, but these models tend to assume either best response dynamics (where individuals instantly switch to better paying strategies) or imitation dynamics (where individuals copy successful strategies from neighbours), and do not systematically compare predictions under the two assumptions. Here we propose an iterated game on a social network with payoff functions that depend on the state of the resource. Agents harvest the resource, and the strategy composition of the population evolves until an equilibrium is reached. The system is then repeatedly perturbed and allowed to re-equilibrate. We compare model predictions under best response and imitation dynamics. Compared to imitation dynamics, best response dynamics increase sustainability of the system, the persistence of cooperation while decreasing inequality and debt corresponding to the Gini index in the agents’ cumulative payoffs. Additionally, for best response dynamics, the number of strategy switches before equilibrium fits a power-law distribution under a subset of the parameter space, suggesting the system is in a state of self-organized criticality. We find little variation in most mean results over different network topologies; however, there is significant variation in the distributions of the raw data, equality of payoff, clustering of like strategies and power-law fit. We suggest the primary mechanisms driving the difference in sustainability between the two strategy update rules to be the clustering of like strategies as well as the time delay imposed by an imitation processes. Given the strikingly different outcomes for best response versus imitation dynamics for common-pool resource systems, our results suggest that modellers should choose strategy update rules that best represent decision-making in their study systems.

寻求利润的个人之间共享资源的提取涉及个人利益与资源持久性所代表的集体福祉之间的紧张关系。许多博弈论模型都探讨了这种情况，但是这些模型倾向于假定最佳响应动态（个人立即转而采用更好的付费策略）或模仿动态（个人从邻居那里复制成功的策略），并且没有系统地比较这两种情况下的预测假设。在这里，我们提出了一种社交网络上的迭代游戏，该游戏具有取决于资源状态的支付功能。代理人收获资源，种群的战略构成不断发展，直到达到平衡为止。然后，该系统反复受到干扰，并重新平衡。我们在最佳响应和模仿动态下比较模型预测。与模仿动力学相比，最佳响应动力学提高了系统的可持续性，合作的持续性，同时减少了与代理商累积收益中的基尼系数相对应的不平等和债务。此外，为了获得最佳的响应动力学，在参数空间的子集下均衡拟合幂律分布之前，策略切换的次数表明系统处于自组织临界状态。我们发现在不同的网络拓扑上，大多数平均结果几乎没有变化。但是，原始数据的分布，回报的均等性，类似策略的聚类和幂律拟合都存在显着差异。我们建议驱动这两个策略更新规则之间的可持续性差异的主要机制是类似策略的聚类以及模仿过程带来的时间延迟。鉴于公共池资源系统的最佳响应与模仿动态的结果截然不同，我们的结果表明，建模者应选择最能代表其研究系统决策的策略更新规则。