To understand how retailer competition affects supply chain partners’ operational and financial decisions under guarantee credit financing (GCF), we examine a supply chain system composed of a capital-constrained retailer, a capital-abundant retailer and a manufacturer in the presence of substitutable product competition. By identifying the strategic interaction among the retailers and the manufacturer, we find that when the production cost is low, the retailers’ equilibrium order quantities depend on their optimal equilibrium profits, otherwise on the dominant retailer's and the manufacturer's optimal equilibrium profits. If both GCF and BCF are viable, then when the production cost is smaller than a certain threshold, GCF is the unique financing equilibrium, and BCF otherwise. We also analyse the extensions of general demand distribution and positive risk-free rate under GCF. We also find that competition hurts the weak retailer's profit but increases the dominant retailer's profit if the manufacturer's production cost exceeds a certain threshold.

为了理解在担保信贷融资 (GCF) 下零售商竞争如何影响供应链合作伙伴的运营和财务决策，我们研究了一个由资本受限零售商、资本充足零售商和制造商组成的供应链系统，其中存在可替代产品竞赛。通过识别零售商和制造商之间的战略互动，我们发现当生产成本较低时，零售商的均衡订货量取决于其最优均衡利润，否则取决于优势零售商和制造商的最优均衡利润。如果 GCF 和 BCF 都可行，那么当生产成本小于某个阈值时，GCF 为唯一融资均衡，否则为 BCF。我们还分析了 GCF 下一般需求分布和正无风险利率的扩展。我们还发现，如果制造商的生产成本超过某个阈值，竞争会损害弱零售商的利润，但会增加优势零售商的利润。