Abstract In this paper, we study how to disclose the precision of the winner selection mechanism (i.e., the contest success function) that determines how effective a player’s effort is in determining his/her winning probability. Specifically, we focus on the disclosure of the adopted discriminatory power r of the Tullock contest. The discriminatory power r is exogenously given, and the contest organizer knows more than contestants about the true state of r . We examine the optimal disclosure policy that maximizes the expected sum of contestants’ efforts. In addition to public disclosure, we study private disclosure over groups with independent signals. We establish the optimality of full disclosure/concealment.

中文翻译：

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竞赛机制信息公开

摘要 在本文中，我们研究了如何揭示获胜者选择机制（即比赛成功函数）的精度，该机制决定了玩家的努力在确定他/她的获胜概率方面的有效性。具体来说，我们关注 Tullock 竞赛采用的歧视性权力 r 的披露。判别力 r 是外生赋予的，竞赛组织者比参赛者更了解 r 的真实状态。我们研究了使参赛者努力的预期总和最大化的最佳披露政策。除了公开披露之外，我们还研究了对具有独立信号的群体的私人披露。我们建立了完全披露/隐藏的最优性。