ABSTRACT

This paper examines market entrance and pricing strategies for a remanufacturer with capital constraint and competition from an original equipment manufacturer. In the study, the remanufacturer is divided into two types, namely the H-type and L-type, and is assumed to have access to bank loans and equity financing to ease the capital constraint. With the Nash game, it is found that (i) if remanufacturing is costly, the remanufacturer will choose partial remanufacturing and not enter into the remanufacturing market until the equity financing ratio excesses a certain threshold. (ii) A H-type remanufacturer is more flexible in term of market entrance than a L-type remanufacturer. (iii) The remanufacturer’s profit increases first and then decreases in the equity ratio. (iv) Equity ratio and interest rate have opposite effects on the pricing of the new and remanufactured products. Furthermore, with some research extensions, it is exhibited that the results and managerial implications developed in the paper hold well for different financing modes and the random demand setting, and hence are robust to a good extent.

摘要

本文研究了资本约束和原始设备制造商竞争的再制造商的市场准入和定价策略。在研究中，再制造商分为H型和L型两种，假设可以通过银行贷款和股权融资来缓解资本约束。通过纳什博弈发现（i）如果再制造成本较高，则再制造商会选择部分再制造，直到股权融资比例超过一定阈值后才进入再制造市场。(ii) H型再制造商在市场准入方面比L型再制造商更灵活。(iii) 再制造商的利润先增加后减少的权益比率。(iv) 权益比率和利率对新产品和再制造产品的定价具有相反的影响。此外，通过一些研究扩展，表明本文得出的结果和管理意义适用于不同的融资模式和随机需求设置，因此具有良好的稳健性。