Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) is an emerging technology which has been widely applied in various scenarios, such as tracking, object monitoring, and social networks, etc. Cloning attacks can severely disturb the RFID systems, such as missed detection for the missing tags. Although there are some techniques with physical architecture design or complicated encryption and cryptography proposed to prevent the tags from being cloned, it is difficult to definitely avoid the cloning attack. Therefore, cloning attack detection and identification are critical for the RFID systems. Prior works rely on that each clone tag will reply to the reader when its corresponding genuine tag is queried. In this article, we consider a more general attack model, in which each clone tag replies to the reader's query with a predefined probability, i.e., attack probability. We concentrate on identifying the tags being attacked with the probability no less than a threshold PtP_{t} with the required identification reliability α\alpha . We first propose a basic protocol to Identify the Probabilistic Cloning Attacks with required identification reliability for the large-scale RFID systems called IPCA. Then we propose two enhanced protocols called MS-IPCA and S-IPCA respectively to improve the identification efficiency. We theoretically analyze the parameters of the proposed IPCA, MS-IPCA and S-IPCA protocols to maximize the identification efficiency. Finally we conduct extensive simulations to validate the effectiveness of the proposed protocols.

中文翻译：

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无处可藏：有效识别大规模 RFID 系统中的概率克隆攻击


射频识别（RFID）是一项新兴技术，已广泛应用于跟踪、对象监控、社交网络等各种场景。克隆攻击会严重扰乱RFID系统，例如丢失标签的漏检。尽管提出了一些物理架构设计或复杂的加密和密码学技术来防止标签被克隆，但很难绝对避免克隆攻击。因此，克隆攻击检测和识别对于RFID系统至关重要。先前的工作依赖于每个克隆标签在其对应的真实标签被查询时都会回复阅读器。在本文中，我们考虑一种更通用的攻击模型，其中每个克隆标签以预定义的概率（即攻击概率）回复读者的查询。我们专注于以不小于阈值 PtP_{t} 的概率和所需的识别可靠性 α\alpha 来识别受到攻击的标签。我们首先提出了一种识别概率性克隆攻击的基本协议，该协议具有大规模 RFID 系统所需的识别可靠性，称为 IPCA。然后我们提出了两种增强协议，分别称为MS-IPCA和S-IPCA来提高识别效率。我们从理论上分析了所提出的 IPCA、MS-IPCA 和 S-IPCA 协议的参数，以最大限度地提高识别效率。最后，我们进行了广泛的模拟来验证所提出的协议的有效性。