Abstract

We consider strategic pricing problems in which each firm chooses between a non-cooperative (individual pricing) strategy and a cooperative (price negotiation) strategy. We first analyze a monopoly supply chain involving a supplier and a retailer, and then investigate two competing supply chains each consisting of a supplier and a retailer. We find that an appropriate power allocation between the supplier and the retailer can make the two firms benefit from negotiating the wholesale and retail prices. When the supplier negotiates the wholesale price, the retailer’s cooperative strategy can always induce supply chain coordination in the monopoly setting, whereas the two supply chains in the duopoly setting can be possibly coordinated only when the retailers determine their retail prices individually. In both the monopoly and duopoly settings, the wholesale price negotiation is a necessary part of the communications between supply chain members. When the supply chain competition intensifies, all firms are more likely to determine their prices individually rather than to negotiate their prices.

摘要

我们考虑战略定价问题，其中每个公司都在非合作（个体定价）策略和合作（价格谈判）策略之间进行选择。我们首先分析涉及供应商和零售商的垄断供应链，然后研究两个相互竞争的供应链，每个供应商都由供应商和零售商组成。我们发现，在供应商和零售商之间进行适当的权力分配可以使两家公司从批发和零售价格的谈判中受益。当供应商协商批发价格时，零售商的合作策略总是可以在垄断环境中引起供应链的协调，而双寡头垄断环境中的两个供应链只有在零售商分别确定其零售价格时才可能进行协调。在“垄断”和“双重垄断”设置中，批发价格谈判是供应链成员之间沟通的必要部分。当供应链竞争加剧时，所有公司更有可能单独确定价格而不是协商价格。