Abstract

This paper studies a healthcare system under two priority charging schemes. The first is a fee-for-priority (FFP) scheme under which the patients can choose to buy the priorities or not at their admission or readmission to the healthcare provider (HCP). The second is a bundled priority (BP) scheme under which the HCP receives a lump sum priority payment from patients for the entire episode of priority visits (regardless of the number of readmissions). Under both schemes, a certain proportion of revenue of the HCP (the reimbursement) is used to improve the service quality for patients. A two-stage Stackelberg game is established that captures the non-cooperative interactions between the HCP and patients, where the HCP is the leader who sets a price of priority and patients are the followers who decide whether to buy the priorities or not. We first characterize the Pareto-dominant equilibrium strategy of patients under the FFP and BP schemes, and we find that the total cost (including delay disutility and priority fee) of patients can be reduced if the patient pool is large. Although patients' minimum cost, including waiting cost and priority payment, is obtained under both the FFP and BP schemes, the prices are more flexible under the former than the latter. Finally, we demonstrate that implementing the FFP scheme can induce higher social welfare than the BP scheme.

中文翻译：

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具有优先级的医疗系统中的报销政策：优先级费用与捆绑式优先级

摘要

本文研究了两种优先收费方案下的医疗系统。第一个是按优先级收费（FFP）计划，根据该计划，患者可以在入院或再入医护人员（HCP）时选择购买优先级或不购买优先级。第二种是捆绑式优先（BP）计划，根据该计划，HCP会在整个优先访问期间（无论再次住院的次数）从患者那里获得一次性总付的优先付款。在这两种方案下，一定比例的HCP收入（报销）用于改善患者的服务质量。建立了一个两阶段的Stackelberg游戏，该游戏捕获了HCP与患者之间的非合作互动，其中HCP是确定优先级价格的领导者，而患者是决定是否购买优先级的追随者。我们首先描述了在FFP和BP计划下患者的Pareto优势平衡策略，并且我们发现，如果患者人数众多，则可以降低患者的总成本（包括延迟无用费和优先费）。尽管在FFP和BP计划下均获得了患者的最低费用，包括等待费用和优先付款，但前者的价格比后者更为灵活。最后，我们证明了实施FFP计划比BP计划可以带来更高的社会福利。在FFP和BP两种方案下均可获得价格，前者的价格比后者更为灵活。最后，我们证明了实施FFP计划比BP计划可以带来更高的社会福利。在FFP和BP两种方案下均可获得价格，前者的价格比后者更为灵活。最后，我们证明了实施FFP计划比BP计划可以带来更高的社会福利。