Every year, the rate at which technology is applied on areas of our everyday life is increasing at a steady pace. This rapid development drives the technology companies to design and fabricate their integrated circuits (ICs) in non-trustworthy outsourcing foundries to reduce the cost, thus, leaving space for a synchronous form of virus, known as Hardware Trojan (HT), to be developed. HTs leak encrypted information, degrade device performance or lead to total destruction. To reduce the risks associated with these viruses, various approaches have been developed aiming to prevent and detect them, based on conventional or machine learning methods. Ideally, any undesired modification made to an IC should be detectable by pre-silicon verification/simulation and post-silicon testing. The infected circuit can be inserted in different stages of the manufacturing process, rendering the detection of HTs a complicated procedure. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review of research dedicated to countermeasures against HTs embedded into ICs. The literature is grouped in four main categories; (a) conventional HT detection approaches, (b) machine learning for HT countermeasures, (c) design for security and (d) runtime monitor.

每年，技术在我们日常生活领域中的应用率都在稳定增长。这种快速的发展驱使技术公司在不可靠的外包代工厂中设计和制造集成电路（IC），以降低成本，从而为被称为硬件特洛伊木马（HT）的同步形式的病毒留下了发展空间。 。HT泄漏加密的信息，降低设备性能或导致完全破坏。为了降低与这些病毒相关的风险，基于常规或机器学习方法，已经开发出各种旨在预防和检测它们的方法。理想情况下，应通过硅前验证/模拟和硅后测试来检测对IC进行的任何不希望的修改。被感染的电路可以插入到制造过程的不同阶段，从而使HT的检测变得复杂。在本文中，我们将对专门针对IC中嵌入的HT的对策进行全面的研究综述。文献分为四个主要类别。（a）传统的HT检测方法，（b）HT对策的机器学习，（c）安全设计和（d）运行时监控器。