A direct mechanism of impact on the utility functions of agents in social and economic systems is studied. This mechanism is widely used in various forms by public authorities, commercial and non-profit organizations for reaching the desired behavior of individuals. A game-theoretic model of a hierarchical system composed of agents and super-individuals who can modify their utility functions is considered. The properties of equilibria in this model are investigated and the systems of different structure are compared with each other in terms of efficiency. It is established that the centralized management of super-individuals in certain conditions may be less effective in terms of maximizing public welfare than the decentralized schemes. In particular, this property can explain the successful development of peer-to-peer markets and decentralized financing mechanisms of projects in various spheres of human activity. Also, the presence of vertical competition effects in the system is demonstrated, which reduce the efficiency of equilibria with increasing the number of super-individuals.

研究了在社会和经济系统中影响代理人效用函数的直接机制。公共机构，商业和非营利组织以各种形式广泛使用此机制，以达到所需的个人行为。考虑了由可以修改其效用函数的主体和超个人组成的分层系统的博弈论模型。研究了该模型中的平衡性，并比较了不同结构的系统的效率。可以确定的是，在某些情况下，对超级个人的集中管理在最大程度地实现公共福利方面可能不如分权计划有效。尤其是，该特性可以解释点对点市场的成功发展以及人类活动各个领域中项目的分散融资机制。此外，还证明了系统中存在垂直竞争效应，这会随着超个人数量的增加而降低均衡的效率。