We demonstrate through theoretical, empirical, and sociocultural evidence that the concept of impulsivity fails the basic requirements of a psychological construct and should be rejected as such. Impulsivity (or impulsiveness) currently holds a central place in psychological theory, research, and clinical practice and is considered a multifaceted concept. However, impulsivity falls short of the theoretical specifications for hypothetical constructs by having meaning that is not compatible with psychometric, neuroscience, and clinical data. Psychometric findings indicate that impulsive traits and behaviors (e.g., response inhibition, delay discounting) are largely uncorrelated and fail to load onto a single, superordinate latent variable. Modern neuroscience has also failed to identify a specific and central neurobehavioral mechanism underlying impulsive behaviors and instead has found separate neurochemical systems and loci that contribute to a variety of impulsivity types. Clinically, these different impulsivity types show diverging and distinct pathways and processes relating to behavioral and psychosocial health. The predictive validity and sensitivity of impulsivity measures to pharmacological, behavioral, and cognitive interventions also vary based on the impulsivity type evaluated and clinical condition examined. Conflation of distinct personality and behavioral mechanisms under a single umbrella of impulsivity ultimately increases the likelihood of misunderstanding at a sociocultural level and facilitates misled hypothesizing and artificial inconsistencies for clinical translation. We strongly recommend that, based on this comprehensive evidence, psychological scientists and neuroscientists reject the language of impulsivity in favor of a specific focus on the several well-defined and empirically supported factors that impulsivity is purported to cover. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

---

拒绝冲动作为一种心理结构：一个理论、经验和社会文化的论点。

我们通过理论、经验和社会文化证据证明，冲动的概念不符合心理结构的基本要求，因此应该被拒绝。冲动性（或冲动性）目前在心理学理论、研究和临床实践中占据中心位置，被认为是一个多方面的概念。然而，由于具有与心理测量学、神经科学和临床数据不兼容的含义，冲动性没有达到假设结构的理论规范。心理测量结果表明，冲动性状和行为（例如，反应抑制、延迟折扣）在很大程度上是不相关的，并且无法加载到单个上级潜在变量上。现代神经科学也未能确定冲动行为背后的特定和中枢神经行为机制，而是发现了导致各种冲动类型的独立神经化学系统和基因座。在临床上，这些不同的冲动类型显示出与行为和心理社会健康相关的不同且不同的途径和过程。冲动测量对药理学、行为和认知干预的预测有效性和敏感性也因评估的冲动类型和检查的临床状况而异。在冲动的单一保护伞下将不同的人格和行为机制混为一谈，最终会增加在社会文化层面产生误解的可能性，并促进临床翻译的误导性假设和人为不一致。我们强烈建议，基于这些全面的证据，心理科学家和神经科学家拒绝使用冲动的语言，而支持特别关注冲动据称涵盖的几个明确定义和经验支持的因素。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2020 APA，保留所有权利）。心理科学家和神经科学家拒绝使用冲动的语言，而是特别关注冲动据称涵盖的几个明确定义和经验支持的因素。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2020 APA，保留所有权利）。心理科学家和神经科学家拒绝使用冲动的语言，而是特别关注冲动据称涵盖的几个明确定义和经验支持的因素。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2020 APA，保留所有权利）。