Dynamic pricing schemes are increasingly employed across industries to maintain a self-organized balance of demand and supply. However, throughout complex dynamical systems, unintended collective states exist that may compromise their function. Here we reveal how dynamic pricing may induce demand-supply imbalances instead of preventing them. Combining game theory and time series analysis of dynamic pricing data from on-demand ride-hailing services, we explain this apparent contradiction. We derive a phase diagram demonstrating how and under which conditions dynamic pricing incentivizes collective action of ride-hailing drivers to induce anomalous supply shortages. We identify characteristic patterns in the price dynamics reflecting these supply anomalies by disentangling different timescales in price time series of ride-hailing services at 137 locations across the globe. Our results provide systemic insights for the regulation of dynamic pricing, in particular in publicly accessible mobility systems, by unraveling under which conditions dynamic pricing schemes promote anomalous supply shortages.

跨行业越来越多地采用动态定价方案，以保持自组织的供需平衡。然而，在整个复杂的动力系统中，存在可能损害其功能的意外集体状态。在这里，我们揭示了动态定价如何导致供需失衡而不是阻止它们。结合来自按需乘车服务的动态定价数据的博弈论和时间序列分析，我们解释了这个明显的矛盾。我们得出了一个相图，展示了动态定价如何以及在何种条件下激励网约车司机的集体行动，从而导致异常供应短缺。我们通过解开全球 137 个地点的叫车服务价格时间序列的不同时间尺度，确定了反映这些供应异常的价格动态中的特征模式。我们的结果为动态定价的监管提供了系统的见解，特别是在可公开访问的移动系统中，通过解开动态定价方案在哪些条件下促进异常供应短缺。