Drivers cruising for scarce on-street parking in city centers create negative externalities, including congestion and pollution. We apply a serious game – PARKGAME – to understand and model drivers' two intertwined instantaneous parking choices: when to quit cruising and where to cruise. Forty-nine participants took part in a lab experiment in which they had to arrive on time to a fictional appointment or face monetary penalties, and had to choose between uncertain but cheap on-street parking or a certain but costly parking lot. Scenarios diverged on the time to appointment and distance between the meeting place and parking lot locations. Participants played a series of 8 or 16 computer games on a Manhattan grid road network with high on-street parking occupancy and a nearby parking lot of unlimited capacity. Players’ parking choices were analyzed with accelerated-failure time (AFT) and multinomial logistic regression models. Results show that drivers are mostly myopic and risk-averse, and quit their on-street parking search long before the optimal moment. Spatially, drivers are attracted by the lot-destination axis, and their turn choices at junctions comply with a second-order biased random walk. The implications of game-based methods for simulation model development and sustainable parking policy are further discussed.

开车到市中心稀少的路边停车的驾驶员会造成负面的外部影响，包括交通拥堵和污染。我们应用了一款严肃的游戏-PARKGAME-了解并建模驾驶员的两个相互交织的瞬时停车选择：何时退出巡航以及在哪里停车巡航。四十九名参与者参加了一个实验室实验，他们必须准时到达虚构的约会或面临金钱惩罚，并必须在不确定但便宜的路边停车位或一定但昂贵的停车位之间进行选择。在约会时间和会场与停车场位置之间的距离上，场景各不相同。参与者在曼哈顿网格路网上进行了一系列的8场或16场电脑游戏，路边停车位占用率很高，附近的停车场容量无限。使用加速失败时间（AFT）和多项逻辑回归模型分析了运动员的停车选择。结果表明，驾驶员大多是近视和规避风险的，并且在最佳时刻之前很久就退出了路边停车搜索。在空间上，驾驶员被地标轴所吸引，并且他们在路口的转弯选择符合二阶偏向随机游动。进一步讨论了基于游戏的方法对仿真模型开发和可持续停车政策的影响。