This paper investigates a two-stage supply chain consisting of a battery supplier (BS) and an electric vehicle manufacturer (EVM). Considering consumers’ sensitivity to the battery driving range, the BS can improve the driving range level by investing, and obtain subsidies if the driving range level exceeds the subsidy threshold set by the government. Meanwhile, the BS may misreport his private information of the investment cost to the EVM. We mainly examine the effect of cost information misreporting and how the BS determines the optimal improvement strategy when the subsidy threshold increases. Firstly, a low (high) subsidy threshold makes the BS raise the driving range level above (below) the subsidy threshold; when the subsidy threshold is moderately raised, the choice of the improvement strategy is controlled by both the degree of raising the subsidy threshold and the technical upper limit. Secondly, participants may show different preferences for the improvement strategy under certain conditions. Finally, cost information misreporting brings adverse effects to participants and reduces the driving range level.

中文翻译：

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考虑补贴门槛和成本误报的电动汽车供应链电池续航里程改进策略

本文研究了由电池供应商 (BS) 和电动汽车制造商 (EVM) 组成的两阶段供应链。考虑到消费者对电池续航里程的敏感性，BS 可以通过投资提高续航里程水平，如果续航里程水平超过政府设定的补贴门槛，则获得补贴。同时，BS 可能会向 EVM 错误报告其投资成本的私人信息。我们主要检查成本信息误报的影响以及当补贴阈值增加时 BS 如何确定最佳改进策略。首先，低（高）补贴阈值使BS将续驶里程水平提高到（低于）补贴阈值；适度提高补贴门槛时，改进策略的选择由补贴门槛提高的程度和技术上限共同控制。其次，参与者可能在一定条件下对改进策略表现出不同的偏好。最后，成本信息误报给参与者带来不利影响，降低行驶里程水平。