In this paper, we investigate the dichotomy between system design delegation driven by requirement allocation and delegation driven by objective allocation. Specifically, we investigate this dichotomy through the lens of agency theory, which addresses cases where an agent makes decisions on behalf of another, that is, a principal. In current practice, design delegation largely involves requirement allocation as a means to inform agents of the desirable system characteristics. The value‐driven design paradigm proposes replacing requirements with objective, or trade‐off, functions to better guide agents toward optimal systems. We apply and adapt the principal–agent mathematical model to the design delegation problem to determine if a principal, that is, the delegator, should communicate using requirements or objectives with her agent. In this model, we assume the case of a single principal and single agent where the agent has certain domain knowledge the principal does not have and the agent accrues costs while solving a delegated design problem. Under the assumptions of the mathematical model, we show that the requirement allocation paradigm can yield greater value to the principal over objective despite limitations requirement allocation places on the principal to learn information from the agent. However, relaxing model assumptions can impact the value proposition of requirement allocation in favor of objective allocation. Therefore, a resolution to the requirement–objective dichotomy may be context dependent. The results and the analytical framework used to derive them provide a new, foundational perspective with which to investigate allocation strategies.

中文翻译：

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基于委托-代理模型的需求和目标分配策略研究

在本文中，我们研究了需求分配驱动的系统设计委托与目标分配驱动的委托之间的二分法。具体来说，我们通过代理理论的视角来研究这种二分法，该理论解决了一个代理代表另一个代理（即委托人）做出决策的情况。在当前的实践中，设计委托在很大程度上涉及需求分配，作为一种手段来通知代理人所需的系统特性。价值驱动的设计范式建议用目标功能或折衷功能代替需求，以更好地指导代理商实现最佳系统。我们将委托人-代理人数学模型应用于设计委托问题，并确定委托人（即委托人）是否应该使用要求或目标与其代理人进行沟通。在这个模型中 我们假设是单个委托人和单个代理的情况，其中代理具有委托人不具备的某些领域知识，并且代理在解决委派设计问题时会产生成本。在数学模型的假设下，我们表明，需求限制范式可以给委托人带来比目标更大的价值，尽管需求分配在委托人上有限制，可以从代理那里学习信息。但是，放宽模型假设可能会影响需求分配的价值主张，而倾向于客观分配。因此，对需求－目标二分法的解决方案可能取决于上下文。结果和用于得出结果的分析框架为研究分配策略提供了新的基础观点。