Vehicular network is the enabler of various services for transportation means including safety and infotainment applications. It can better deal with the highly dynamic nature of roads and highways. Meanwhile, the existing infrastructure of the cellular networks is unable to cope with the heavy traffic imposed mainly by videos. Thus, the cellular operators may leverage Roadside Untis (RSU) to offload video traffic and provide better quality of experience for vehicle customers. In this paper, we propose a pricing model that motivates RSU owners to cooperate with the cellular operators in order to offer better quality of experience (QoE) and offload substantial part of videos traffic from the cellular networks. The pricing model also motivates the vehicle owners to cooperate with the RSU to deliver contents to each other and aims to maximize RSU revenue and provide a wide range of QoS levels to the content providers in order to give them a degree of freedom to choose the suitable level of quality for their customers and based on their allocated budgets. We prove this problem is hard to solve, then we propose a lightweight greedy methods as alternative solutions. The conducted results show the efficiency of the proposed solutions and their ability to obtain results similar or so close to the optimal solutions.

车载网络是各种运输工具服务的促成因素，包括安全和信息娱乐应用。它可以更好地应对公路和高速公路的高度动态性。同时，蜂窝网络的现有基础设施无法应付主要由视频带来的繁重流量。因此，蜂窝运营商可以利用路边联通（RSU）卸载视频流量，并为车辆客户提供更好的体验质量。在本文中，我们提出了一种定价模型，该模型可以激励RSU所有者与蜂窝运营商合作，以提供更好的体验质量（QoE）并从蜂窝网络上卸载大部分视频流量。定价模型还激励车主与RSU合作，以互相传递内容，并旨在最大程度地提高RSU收入并向内容提供商提供广泛的QoS级别，以便他们可以自由选择合适的客户的质量水平以及基于分配预算的质量水平。我们证明这个问题很难解决，然后我们提出了一种轻量级的贪婪方法作为替代解决方案。进行的结果表明了所提出的解决方案的效率及其获得与最佳解决方案相近或接近的结果的能力。然后我们提出一种轻量级的贪婪方法作为替代解决方案。进行的结果表明所提出的解决方案的效率及其获得与最佳解决方案相近或接近的结果的能力。然后我们提出一种轻量级的贪婪方法作为替代解决方案。进行的结果表明了所提出的解决方案的效率及其获得与最佳解决方案相近或接近的结果的能力。